This paper investigates how process data like response time and click position relates to economic decisions. We use a social value orientation experiment, which can be considered as a prototypical multi-attribute decision problem. We find that in the social value orientation task more individualistic subjects have shorter response times than prosocial subjects. Individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others' payoffs, and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. These results show that response times and click positions can be used as indicators of people's preferences.
Introduction
There is an increasing interest in using process data to get a better understanding of economic decision making. Different methods such as response times (Rubinstein 2007) , pupil dilations (Wang et al. 2010) , eye movements (Reutskaja et al. 2011 ) and even neural activity (Smith et al. 2014 ) have been introduced and have shown significant correspondences between this kind of data and people's decisions. These methods vary significantly in their complexity and some of them are quite costly. We show that simple by-product data in lab or online economic experiments, such as response times and click positions, can provide information about people's preferences. With a proper design, this data can be collected at almost no cost. While response time analysis has been used frequently (for a review, see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann 2015) , click positions have received little attention so far.
Specifically, we use a social value orientation (SVO) experiment in which the response times and the click positions are recorded. The SVO task consists of several decision situations, each consisting of a menu of allocations between the deciding subject and an anonymous partner. Thus, the SVO measures how much people care about the own as compared to the other player's welfare. The SVO task represents a prototypical situation in which people have to assess and trade-off different attributes of an option -in the case of the SVO the own vs the other's payoff. Our results show that more prosocial subjects take longer to make their decisions in the SVO task. Concerning the click position, we find that individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others' payoffs, and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. Thus, response time and click position can be used as indicators of people's preferences.
Response time has increasingly been used in economic experiments (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich et al. 2014; Hutcherson et al. 2015) , in particular as an indicator whether a decision is made intuitively or deliberatively (Krajbich et al. forthcoming; Rand et al. 2012; Piovesan and Wengström 2009; Schulz et al. 2014; Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer 2014) . Most closely related to our study is Fiedler et al. (2013) , who use eye tracking technology to investigate the underlying processes of social decision making. They find that differences in SVO are accompanied by consistent differences in information search and response times. There is a tradition in tracking the behaviour of subjects on. The most prominent example is probably MouseLab 1 (Payne et al. 1993; Brocas et al. 2014) . In this environment, subjects access the information hidden behind boxes on the computer screen by moving the cursor over the boxes. Another method that uses the natural interaction is "response dynamics" (Spivey et al. 2005; Kieslich and Hilbig 2014; Koop and Johnson 2011) . In this paradigm, the mouse response is tracked as subjects move from a central location to one of two disparately spaced options.
The curvature of the mouse movement is taken as an indicator of cognitive conflicts and more curved response trajectories indicate stronger conflicts.
We confirm previous evidence that response time correlates with subjects' preferences and find that also the click position correlates with subjects' preferences. The click position provides much less detailed information than MouseLab, but it has the advantage that it records natural behavior while the need to move the mouse in MouseLab requires a somewhat less natural information acquisition strategy. In this sense, the analysis of the click position is similar to the response dynamics paradigm, which uses also the computer interaction as an additional source of information. Our study highlights the potential benefits of recording response times and click positions in economic experiments involving multiple attribute decision making and using this data to infer people's preferences. The experiment is built on the SVO Slider Measure by Murphy et al. (2011) . In this task, subjects make a series of allocation decisions. In each allocation decision, the subject chooses one out of nine allocations involving varying payoffs for herself and another anonymous participant. A screenshot of one item is shown in Figure 1 . In this example, the subject can choose one of nine options from the most individualistic distribution on the right to the most altruistic distribution on the left. The subjects make their decisions by clicking on the allocation that they prefer most, i.e. they click into one of the dark grey areas. Before the distributional decision, the subjects need to click on a button which appears in the lower region of the screen to get into the decision situation. Thus, the mouse is always positioned horizontally in the middle and vertically in the lower part of the screen when the decision is to be made. For each decision, we record the subject's response time and the coordinate of the position that the subject clicks. In the SVO task, there are 6 primary items that allow assessing the subject's concern for the payoff of the other player. The sum of chosen allocations determines a vector in the plane of the own and the other player's payoff. The angle from the axis of the own payoff to this vector (hereafter, SVO angle) provides a scale of SVO and indicates the concern for the welfare of others. In addition, there are 9 secondary items, which allow distinguishing the prosocial motives of inequality aversion and efficiency. We do not refer to this distinction in our study, but we use the secondary items to check the robustness of our results.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . A total of 132 students recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) took part in the experiment between October and November 2014.
The experiment took place in the Lakelab at the University of Konstanz. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned into groups of two persons. We randomized the order of the 15 items for each group. At the end of the session, one of the 15 items was randomly selected to be paid out in each group according to one person's choice, who was randomly determined as well. The SVO task was part of another experiment and conducted at the beginning of the session (see Instructions in the Appendix). The whole experiment lasted for about one and a half hours and the subjects earned 13.80
Euro on average.
Results

Fig. 2 The distribution of the SVO angles
We first assess subjects' SVOs using their decisions in the primary items and report the corresponding SVO angle in Figure 68 (51.52%) subjects are prosocial, 63 (47.73%) subjects are individualistic, and 1 (0.76%) subject is competitive.
Next we study the correlation between the SVOs and the response times. There are two reasons why we expect shorter response times for individualistic subjects in the SVO task. First, individualistic subjects have smaller information requirements because they do not care about the payoff of the other player. This has also been shown in eye tracking studies (Fiedler et al. 2013) . Second, for the individualistic subjects the decision does not involve a conflict (or involves a weak conflict) between different motives while for prosocial subjects most of the decisions are associated with a stronger conflict between the own payoff and the payoff for the other player. It has been shown that the number of cognitive conflicts between motives and the degree of conflict lead to longer response times (Chen and Fischbacher 2015; Evans et al. forthcoming) . Therefore, we expect that, on average, the subjects with higher SVOs are slower in making decision in the SVO task 3 . ). That is, the subjects with higher SVOs are slower in making decisions in the SVO task.
Result 1. The subjects who are more prosocial are slower in making decisions in the SVO task.
This result is based on the data of the primary items, which we use to determine the subjects' SVOs at the same time. The secondary items are used to assess the degree of inequality aversion and the degree of joint gain maximization among prosocial subjects. Thus, the data of the secondary items allows us to check the robustness of our first result. The right panel of Figure 3 indicates that the response times in the secondary items are also positively correlated with the SVO angles (Spearman 3 If there are many subjects in each SVO type, the response times should increase from pure individualistic subjects to pure altruistic subjects, as well as from pure individualistic subjects to pure competitive subjects. That is, there should exist a U relationship between the response times and the SVO angles. In the SVO slider measure, a perfectly consistent individualistic subject yields an angle between -7.82 o and 7.82 o . In our experiment, there is no altruistic subjects and only 1 subjects whose SVO angle is less than -7.82 o . Therefore, we expect that, on average, the response time increases with the SVO angle in our study. 4 To test the robustness of our findings, we also conducted the analysis using the untransformed response times, which essentially led to the same results.
two-sided test, ρ = 0.522, p < 10 -9 ), which confirms our first finding. Moreover, the regression results in Table 1 show that the coefficients of SVO angle are significantly positive in both primary and secondary items, also if we control for the decision number and the distance that the cursor has to move from the button in the bottom-center to the chosen option. The sign of the distance that the cursor has to move is negative, which is counterintuitive at first glance. It seems that the extreme decisions are easier to take. This is consistent with a view that at least some subjects were willing to take an even more extreme decision and, therefore, the decision is particularly easy. (RT) . Decision Number is the number of the decision situation which measures the subjects' experiences. Distance from the Bottom-Center is the linear distance that the cursor has to move from the continue button in the bottom-center to the center of the chosen option. The distance is measured using the same unit as the click position analysis. The robust standard errors are clustered on each subject and reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Now, we turn to the correlation between the click positions and people's preferences. In the experiment, the subjects make decisions by clicking on one of the options which they prefer most. The option contains the own as well as the other player's payoff. The click position informs about the focus of people's attention in the final stage of the decision. Our main interest is whether the subjects click on their own or the others' payoffs. Thus, we focus on the y-coordinates of the click positions. We expect that individualistic subjects put most attention on their own payoffs since they care more about their own payoffs, while prosocial subjects distribute their attention among both payoffs since they care about both their own payoffs and the others' payoffs (Funaki et al. 2014; Fiedler et al. 2013) . 5 5 There is only 1 competitive subject in our experiment. We omit this subject in the click position analysis. For a statistical analysis, we count how many times that each subject click on her own payoff, the other's payoff and the middle areas between her own payoff and the other's payoff. Table   2 and 3 show the distributions of these frequency combinations for individualistic and prosocial subjects respectively. For example, 27 of the individualistic subjects always click into the regions of the own payoff, 4 always click into the regions of the other player's payoff and 2 always click into the middle areas. Of the 63 individualistic subjects, 41 subjects click more often on the own payoff and only 18 click more often on the other's payoff. These frequencies are significantly different (twosided binomial test, p = 0.004). This is different for prosocial subjects. Of the 68 prosocial subjects, 27 subjects click more often on the own payoff and 31 click more often on the other's payoff. So prosocial subjects even click more frequently on the payoff of the other player but the frequencies are not significantly different (two-sided binomial test, p = 0.694). We can also directly compare the distribution of the individualistic subjects with the distribution of the prosocial subjects. Individualistic subjects click significantly more on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects, they click significantly less often on the others' payoffs than prosocial subjects, and the number of times that subjects click on the middle areas are not significantly different between the two groups (two-sided bootstrap KolmogorovSmirnov tests, p = 0.014, p = 0.007 and p = 0.994 respectively). That is, individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others' payoffs; and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects.
Result 2. Individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others' payoffs;
and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. Similar to the response time analysis, we can also use the data of the secondary items to check the robustness of our result regarding the click positions. Figure 5 displays histograms of the ycoordinates of the click positions in the secondary items. As in the primary items, most of the click positions of individualistic subjects are located in the regions of their own payoffs, while a higher proportion of the click positions of prosocial subjects are located in the regions of the others' payoffs. Table 4 and 5 shows the distributions of the frequency combinations of the click positions in the secondary items, separately for individualistic and prosocial subjects. Also for the secondary items, the majority of individualistic subjects click more frequently on the own payoff, 39 subjects in comparison 23 who click more frequently in the other player's payoff. These frequencies are marginally significantly different (two-sided binomial test, p = 0.056). This is also different for prosocial subjects.
Of the 68 prosocial subjects, 24 subjects clicked more often on the own payoff and 38 clicked more often on the other's payoff. Prosocial subjects click more frequently on the payoff of the other player but the frequencies are only marginally statistically different (two-sided binomial test, p = 0.098).
Nevertheless, the two distributions are significantly different. Individualistic subjects click significantly more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects, they click significantly less often on the others' payoffs than prosocial subjects, and the number of times that subjects click on the middle area are not significantly different between the two groups (two-sided bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, p = 0.022, p = 0.003 and p = 0.777 respectively). That is, individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others' payoffs; and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. Thus, the data of the secondary items confirm the robustness of our result regarding the click positions. 
Conclusion
This paper explores the usefulness of response time and click position in economic experiments.
The results of the SVO experiment show that response times are correlated with the strength of people's prosociality and click positions provide information about people's social preferences as well.
Specifically, subjects who are more prosocial are slower in making SVO decisions. Individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others' payoff; and they are more likely to click on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. Furthermore, data of the secondary items of the SVO task confirms the robustness of our results.
Our results are relevant since data about response times and click positions can be collected at almost no cost in lab or online experiments and it is wasteful of not making use of them. Our setting investigates the relevance of different attributes for social preferences. However, the general idea can be applied to any type of choice between multi-attribute options such as consumer decisions, where options differ in price and brand attributes. Also in these kinds of decisions, data of response times and click positions provide additional information about people's preferences and can be used to improve the predictive power. Process data can enhance the analysis of the decision by providing additional evidence that can be economically relevant. For example, response times can provide information about the intuitiveness or difficulty of a decision, and the click position can deliver evidence on potential motives of a decision in addition to the decision itself.
Experiment A
In this experiment, all participants in the lab are randomly divided into groups of two. That is, you are assigned to a group with another participant. Nobody will find out neither during or after the experiment with whom he or she is paired.
This experiment consists of 15 decision situations. In each situation, there are nine options which determine how to distribute points between yourself and the other participant in your group. You can choose one of nine options respectively. At the end of today's experiment, one of the situations will be randomly selected to be paid out according to your decision or the decision of the other participant in your group, which is randomly determined as well. The points in this experiment will be converted into Euro as follows:
1 Point = 0.05 Euro.
Decision on the Screen
The decision situation is displayed as shown in the following screenshot. 
Experiment B Overview
This experiment is repeated for 20 periods. One of the 20 periods will be randomly selected at the end and you will get the points in the corresponding period. The points you earn in this experiment will be converted into Euro as follows:
1 Point = 0.30 Euro.
In each period, all participants in the lab are randomly assigned to groups of four persons. And the group is randomly reassembled at the beginning of each period. Therefore, your group will consist of different participants in different periods. You will not know who is in your group and the other members in your group will not know you are in the group either.
Each period of this experiment consists of two stages. At the first stage you decide how many points you would like to contribute to a project. At the second stage you are informed about the contributions of the other group members, and you can assign deduction points to them.
The following pages describe the course of the experiment in detail.
Stage I
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 20 points as an endowment. You decide how many of the 20 points you would like to contribute to a project. All the points that are contributed to the project by the members of your group are multiplied by 1.6 and divided among the four group members. Therefore, your income consists of two parts: 
Stage II
At the second stage, you will learn how many points each of your group members has contributed and then decide whether to assign deduction points to them or not. If you assign deduction points, maybe it is costly for you. How many deduction points you can assign and what costs are associated with deduction is determined by chance. The following four possibilities occur with equal probabilities:
 0:2 = You have a cost of 0 and the other group member is deducted by 2 points.  0:8 = You have a cost of 0 and the other group member is deducted by 8 points.  2:2 = You have a cost of 2 and the other group member is deducted by 2 points.  2:8 = You have a cost of 2 and the other group member is deducted by 8 points.
You have 120 seconds to decide for each of the three persons. If you do not decide within this time, 3 points will be deducted.
Conversely, the other group members can also assign deduction points to you.
Your income is thus composed of the following parts:
 The income from the first stage.  The total cost of your decisions.  The total deduction points that the others have assigned to you.  Deduction of 3 points for every late decision.
Theoretically it would be possible that the income is negative. But in this case you will receive an income of 0.
Display on the Screen
You make your decision successively on the other three group members. The order of the other three members is random.
Each decision is made on a screen similar to the following screenshot. On this screen you have the following information: your own contribution, the contribution of other group member, your cost when you assign the deduction and the number of points that are deducted from the group member.
The decision is made similar to the contribution decisions. You click on the grey rectangle "Deduction" or "No Deduction" with the left mouse button to make decisions.
If all participants have made decisions on whether to assign deduction or not, you get the information listed on the following screen.
